Habemus Presidentem. With the Lisbon Treaty ratified, the European Council appointed the Belgian Prime Minister Van Rompuy as its President, and Lady Ashton as Vice-President of the European Commission. The echo has been devastating. The Financial Times has called it ‘a colossal failure of ambition’. However, the decisions by the heads of states and governments may have set the European Union in a direction that may turn out more positive than expected.

The Lisbon Treaty intended to make the European Union more democratic and more efficient. After the failure of the Constitutional Treaty, this was a difficult task. The solution has been a compromise with many open questions. The Lisbon Treaty has created the new positions of a non-rotating President of the European Council, appointed for 2 1/2 years, and a Vice-President of the Commission, acting as High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policies. It has also strengthened the President of the European Commission, who can now ‘lay down guidelines for the Commission’s work’ (Art. 17). The Treaty has revalued the European Parliament, which shall elect the President of the Commission and can reject candidates proposed by the European Council. Jointly with the Council, it shall legislate and exercise budgetary functions and political control. These provisions reflect important improvements in the governance of the Union, but the most fundamental question remains open: Where does the balance of power lay between these institutions?

It is not clear from the Treaty’s text, whether the European Council or the Commission President will exercise real power. Nor it is clear whether the Council or the European Parliament will be the dominant legislator in the field of co-decision. Article 15 says: ‘The European Council shall provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and shall define the general political directions and priorities thereof. It shall not exercise legislative functions.’ By contrast, the Commission ’shall promote the general interest of the Union and take appropriate initiatives to that end. It shall ensure the application of the Treaties, […(and)…] oversee the application of Union law […]. It shall execute the budget and manage programmes. It shall exercise coordinating, executive, and management functions’ (Art. 17). Hence, the Commission will be the executive of the Union. But how could the Commission promote the general interest without defining what this interest is? Policy orientations between the European Council and the Commission are therefore likely to clash. Conflicts will be settled by the constitutional reality of Europe’s institutions working with or against each other.

In a similar vein, the Treaty stipulates legislative procedures, which require ‘joint adoption by the European Parliament and the Council of a regulation, directive or decision on a proposal from the Commission’ (Art. 289). It defines what to do when Parliament and Council disagree, but, of course, this says little about who will win.

The European Council’s choices of Rompuy and Ashton may, however, have determined the future balance of power.

First, the European Council has proven once again that it remains handicapped by unanimity. Out of 27 countries only France opposed the appointment of Jean-Claude Junker as President of the Council. Most observers agree that he would have been the ideal profile for a President who can unite Europeans and further the action among governments. But the Swedish presidency was not willing to alienate Nicholas Sarkozy, and Rompuy was therefore appointed as a weak compromise. This does look like a colossal failure of ambition. Incapacity to act is lack of power. However, the decision may turn out to be wise, for the European Council will need a compromise maker as president, who operates in the background of day-to-day politics. A charismatic strong leader would have claimed power, but gained little.

Second, the Lisbon Treaty has maintained the rotating country-presidencies in the Council, i.e. in the body that has to co-legislate with the European Parliament. Each national government will therefore continue to push for policy decisions it considers particularly important, when it holds the chair in the Council. Spain will assume the European Union’s Presidency on the first of January 2010. Few people doubt that Prime Minister Zapatero intends to make his mark with an ambitious agenda under the Spanish Presidency. Other countries will do the same in the future. In other words, there is an inherent tension between the permanent President of the European Council and the rotating member state presidencies. A weak President like Rompuy is more likely to become a successful policy fixer, but he will not be a leader of the executive. One may compare his status with the Presidents of Germany, Austria or Italy, not with the President of the French Republic. In the long run, the European Council will find itself structurally weakened. The power centre will shift to the Commission.

Third, Cathy Ashton’s appointment as the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Vice-President of the European Commission confirms this shift. In fact, the Lisbon Treaty keeps unanimity amongst member states as the modus operandi for foreign policy. Thus, building up a diplomatic service for the Union requires consensus and not imposing and alienating member states. But this function will be assumed by the Vice President of the Commission and reinforces therefore the Commission’s role as the European executive or future European government.

Fourth, there is still a potential power struggle looming in the back of the Lisbon Treaty: the relationship between the European Parliament and the European Council. Parliament must confirm not only the President of the European Commission, but also its members. It can therefore choose the political direction of the European executive. The European Parliament has failed to assume this new power when it confirmed the conservative Manuel Barroso as President with the vote of European Socialists from Spain and Portugal. Voting under instructions from their governments, they betrayed the party platform they had promised their voters, but they can still make up for this by refusing certain commissioners. The European Union is in effect governed by a Great Coalition of centre-right and centre-left parties. This may disappoint citizens, who wished for grater clarity, but it could strengthen the Parliament’s power and capacity to resist the Council when it defends narrow national interests of governments at the expense of citizens’ preferences.

In the long run, these policy orientations may render policy making in the EU more democratic. The European executive will be controlled by Parliament, hence by universal suffrage, and ultimately by citizens. But democracy will only work, if citizens can make choices between alternative policies. The European Council cannot offer such choice to citizens. Only the European Parliament can. But one pre-condition is that European parties formulate alternative programs, nominate competing candidates and fight for citizens’ votes. European democracy will then truly emerge as the winner of the Lisbon Treaty.