rssAll contentColumnsBlogs

After the European Elections: Why we need a more European Social Democracy

Gero MaassMeasured against the hopes of a positive shift in power in favour of social democracy in the wake of the financial and economic crisis, European social democracy, even if the real balance of power has barely changed, is the loser in the European elections in 2009. Leaving aside the general tendency at European elections for opposition and smaller parties to be more successful, not to mention overlaps with existing national topics and elections, the following thesis emerges with regard to the question of winners and losers in the European elections: The winners in European elections tend to be parties which have a strong and clearly identifiable stance towards the European Union. This applies to the frequently mentioned eurosceptic parties, which are to be found mainly at both ends of the political spectrum and partly in conservative spheres, but also to expressly pro-European parties, such as the Greens, which are also among the election winners.

Turning our thesis the other way around, we come to an explanation of the predominantly poor performance of the European social democrats. In many countries, European policy is fiercely disputed among social democrats: France and Austria are particularly striking examples. But in the other countries, too, the party base is characterised by what can most charitably be described as an indifference towards Europe. In addition, the member countries of the Party of European Socialists (PES) do not present a uniform front with regard to European policy aims and policy proposals.

The table below shows yet again that government parties tend to be ‘punished’ disproportionately and loose seats in European elections. The SPD in Germany was able to retain its number of seats in the European Parliament but lost votes, registering its worst ever results in European elections. Social democratic parties that did manage to add to their seats in the European elections are mainly in opposition. Only Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania depart from this explanation, at first glance. In Slovenia, however, the ruling social democratic SD won only 18.5 per cent of the vote, 12 per cent less than in the last parliamentary elections. In Slovakia and Romania, the alarmingly low turnouts of 19.6 per cent and 27 per cent, respectively, and the sometimes poor state of the opposition parties must be factored in to the election analysis.

Creating trust, awakening interest and thereby mobilising the voters

The low voter turnout is often mentioned as a significant factor for the poor performance of social democratic parties. A look at the statistics of the European elections shows that in particular, young people, people with few qualifications and people in the lowest income brackets did not go to the polls. The poor showing of the European social democrats is often attributed to the abstention of these cohorts. This might be true, but it is – to our opinion – not a satisfying explanation for the defeat of the centre-left parties. Instead, the following question has to be answered: Why are these voter groups more difficult to mobilise than others? According to the Eurobarometer, the main reasons why people did not vote in the European elections are: a general lack of trust in politics (28 per cent), the belief that voting makes no difference (17 per cent) and a lack of interest in politics (17 per cent). It is precisely here that the European social democrats have to get to work. A politics that creates trust sets itself apart from the other parties and awakens interest in politics and in shaping Europe’s future. So far, it has failed to do this.

Show more European courage

Many social democrats do not identify themselves with the EU, considering it largely a project of economic liberalism. Indeed, the Lisbon Process, for example – hailed in 2000 as the flagship of the member states, the majority of which were governed by social democrats – has so far failed to bring about the social Europe, which was demanded.

Many, therefore, have come to see salvation as lying in the nation state. A renaissance of the European nation state, however, may no longer be capable of providing robust solutions in a world characterised by new international power structures. Spheres of activity and regulatory competences need a European complement. Many social democratic parties still find it difficult to think in terms of a European horizon. We need, therefore, more ‘European courage’ for social democratic answers to the challenges of globalisation in general and the current financial and economic crisis in particular. In the future, only an active European Union will be able to shape globalisation in social terms.

European elections confirm: European social democrats must also come off the defensive at national level

A decade ago, social democrats governed three-quarters of the 15 member states. Under the aegis of the adoption of the Lisbon Agenda, many imagined that the EU was basking in a social democratic era. In the meantime, Europe’s social democratic and socialist parties have come under considerable pressure, as the European elections confirmed once again. The transformation of the European party landscape is marked by sometimes dramatic losses of trust in relation to centre parties, combined with growth in support for populist parties to the left and the right of the political spectrum.

In many countries, social democracy no longer coincides with the social democratic political movement: the development of a so-called ‘soft’ conservatism (characteristic of the conservative, centre-right or Christian Democrat parties in these countries), which has taken place over the last few years – in particular in Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands and Sweden – confronts the social democratic reformist Left with problems of hitherto unknown dimensions. At the same time, social democratic parties are coming under pressure from populist left-wing movements. Furthermore, right-wing populist parties throughout Europe are recording major increases in the size of their vote, even among formerly social democratic constituencies.

Even though it would be going too far to talk of a wholesale loss of trust in relation to social democrats in Europe, it is, however, striking that precisely in the larger traditionally social democratic countries and in Scandinavia these parties have lost their shine: large parts of the population feel their Lebenswelten threatened, socio-economically, culturally and politically.2 The territory of social democracy is no longer occupied solely by social democrats: social democratic parties in many places are no longer regarded as guarantors of social justice: on the contrary, they are often considered to be heavily complicit in the new uncertainties. Many formerly loyal voters accuse them of having jumped on the neoliberal bandwagon, which ended in the current financial and economic crisis.

Against the background of the developments and uncertainties outlined here, the multitude of tasks has to be managed in such a way that social democratic parties regain credibility and again become the guardians of social democracy and a leading force in Europe:

• A clear social democratic ‘narrative’, expressing values with which the party base can identify, as well as goals and policies which reflect social democracy’s traditional core concerns of social justice and social cohesion;
• A credible and persuasive political leadership based on an active and democratic party, which is also in a position to learn from previous periods in government and to renew itself while in office;
• Making use of all the possibilities provided by the political culture and the electoral system vis-à-vis political opponents;
• A balance of activities which is technically well implemented, substantive and communicated effectively (or, in periods of opposition, proof that the government party has failed to do this);
• The ability to mobilise strategic partners (above all, the trade unions);
• The necessity, in a globalising world, of embedding national considerations in a European and international approach to strategy.

A party’s overall stance is decisive for political success. Narrative, leadership, scope of action, balance of activities, partnerships and European/globalisation strategy must combine in one harmonious profile. At present, this can be said of very few of Europe’s social democratic parties. It is, therefore, not surprising that social democracy suffered another setback in the European elections. Only if social democrats regain a foothold at the national level can success be hoped for at the European level.

Key European policy initiatives with social democratic added value

But a convincing social democratic narrative is lacking not only at the national, but also at the European level. At the core of such a European narrative should be a long-term paradigm change, leading to a social, economically sustainable and citizen-oriented Union with global influence. Both more ‘Europe’ and more social democracy is needed. European policy initiatives must be measured against the following guidelines, which promise a high degree of social democratic added value, make full use of the possibilities offered by the PES in terms of consensus building and improve the Community’s ability to act:

• Live up to global responsibilities: Social democracy should make the global problems of the environment and poverty its own in order to recover national sovereignty and restore to nation states their ability to act.
• Keep strategic partners in view: Are policy proposals something that strategic social partners, above all, the trade unions, can get on board with?
• Strengthen democracy and responsiveness to the needs of ordinary citizens: How do we stand up for more democracy, the personalisation of European politics in elections and responsiveness to the needs of ordinary citizens, without at the same time ushering in a European state?
• Develop European policy options – safeguard national accomplishments: Given the fact that global and European developments have effects on nation states’ economies, social systems and societies which they can no longer control, in future there must also be options at European level. These could also be aimed at safeguarding room to manoeuvre and what has been achieved – above all in terms of social policy – specifically at national level, in the knowledge of the indirect effects of European policies.
• Secure the functionality of the state: The financial crisis, via the economic crisis, must not be allowed to mutate into a crisis of the state, so that the public debt incurred compels the adoption of austerity measures and the advent of the so-called ‘market state’, as a result of which policy options, future viability – for example, through education – and social cohesion fall by the wayside.
• Promote/take advantage of the potential for economic policy cooperation: How can the common economic policy be bolstered after the experiences of recent economic crises? In the short term, coordinated financial market regulations take priority.

More European courage and enthusiasm are essential if convincing answers are to be formulated to the challenges of our time. This applies both at national and European level. Central to this is gaining the upper hand in the debate on social Europe and social globalisation. Of particular significance from the standpoint of social democracy is to establish a legal basis for the political commitment to social cohesion, on a par with competition law. But what sort of terminology should social democrats use to present their core project of developing and safeguarding decent, sustainable and worthwhile work in the European context? Only if we make ourself aware of our fundamental ideals and tried and tested arguments will we be able to come up with convincing formulations which set our standpoints and projects apart from all the others.

Endnotes

1 A longer version of this paper has been written for and presented at the conference “Next Left – last European Elections and their consequences for socialists” jointly organised by Foundation for European Progressive Studies and Karl Renner Institute in Brussel, 8th of September 2009.

2 A study by the Bureau of European Policy Advisers (BEPA) looked into the causes of this threefold uncertainty in its consultation paper ‘Social reality in Europe’: http://ec.europa.eu/citizens_agenda/social_reality_stocktaking/docs/background_document_de.pdf

3 In total, there are 785 seats and 7 groups in the European Parliament; there are also members unattached to a group. The PES has a total of 217 seats in the EP and is therefore the second largest group, behind the EPP-ED.

4 The ‘Coalition for Bulgaria’ is an amalgamation of various social democratic and communist parties, led by the BSP. PBS also belongs to the coalition.

5 The Democratici di Sinistra and the L’Ulivo coalition merged into the Partito Democratico (PD) on 14 October 2007, to which the Christian Democrats also belong. The party is therefore not a member of the PES, although individual party members are MEPs.

6 Since October 2007 a coalition party of various social democratic and socialist parties.

7 From 2001: SLD and Unia Pracy RP.

Tagged as: , , , , , , , , , ,