Are social democrats capable of responding to the opportunities for renewed support for socialism that are offered by the present crisis?

Social democrats have lost ground in Europe during the last few years. The SPD fell to a historical low in the Germany federal election last year, French socialists have been in decline since the last presidential elections, and in Britain Labour is in a difficult position. But in reality, there was no noticeable electoral shift away from the left in the 2000s, in comparison with the 1990s. Rather, the left has split up more significantly than before, into a number of left parties: leftists, greens, social liberals and social democrats themselves. The electoral potential for social-democratic politics has not shrunk, but European social democrats remain unable to offer the kinds of credible alternative solutions that would give them the appeal of a capacity to fill the space created by the crisis. For thirty years the dominance of neoliberalism has undermined the norms of the social market economy. The neoliberal order has reduced these norms down to the single concept of the ‘free market’, and the state to its basic functions; it has banned equality and solidarity, the classic values of social democracy. After decades of neoliberal indoctrination, it is inevitable that social democrats are in difficulties.

The gap between high- and low-income groups has been widening since the 1970s. Social democrats should have made an effort to stop this process – to improve the situation of impoverished social groups, work for the social integration of those who have lost out, and transfer a share of the returns of productivity to those on low salaries. Instead, governing social democrats have persisted in their adoption of flexibility and deregulation, and this put further pressure on wages, employment and working conditions in a socio-economic environment n which worker organisations were totally powerless.

The fall of the Berlin Wall had a particular impact on these negative developments. For the creation of the welfare state would not have been possible without the strong support of a broad coalition of political and social groups after the Second World War: strong communist and socialist parties, organised labour, the backup of engaged Marxist intellectuals. Furthermore, the communist block had a limiting effect on the Western free market, preventing it from yielding to some of its worst impulses. After the 1980s, in the absence of these dissuasive factors, neoliberalism could operate at full throttle.

The industrial revolution created new social classes with conflicting interests. Socialism was a response to the increasing pauperism of the majority while a minority enjoyed the advantages of the ‘big change’. But socialism also represented the rejection of an immoral and irrational system. Its basic values of equality and solidarity were born in this context. And it also grew in reaction to the 1929 crash and the subsequent depression. Once again, it was weaker people were hard hit as the unstable market went into crisis. All this opened the way to the emergence of the welfare state after the Second World War.

There is no need to enumerate the similarities of present conditions with those of the time of the birth of the socialism, and the years before and after the Second World War. It may be that the prevailing circumstances will constitute the context for a new historical opportunity. But it would be unrealistic for social democrats to expect a resurgence of the golden era of the post-war period. Since that time many changes have taken place, modifying completely the nature of the challenges that Europe faces. These include the delocalisation and social rupture entailed in technological progress; social fragmentation and the accompanying atomisation of socio-political demands; an ageing population, which has led to an increasing disproportion between workers and non-workers; and massive immigration, which has given rise to a multi-cultural and heterogeneous society, leading to a weakening of social solidarity. Since these structural changes are irreversible, social democracy must shape its future politics in the light of these factors. At this stage, the most important thing is to rethink the role of the state, and ways to regulate the markets.

Social democracy must keep globalisation and its consequences under control through regulation. Progressive politics should not be aimed at easing poverty, but rather at preventing its emergence. Some social democrats think that ‘not worsening’ would be a satisfactory outcome at present. But the left has to correct, to change, to create, to shape, to improve … If nothing noticeable has to be done, the right does it better. Shall we abandon all human activities to a market radicalism? Or shall we create a model that is adapted to our social and ecological needs? That is the crucial historical problem for social democracy today.