One might argue that there is every reason for the supporters of European social democratic parties to see their hair turn grey in agony. With a few exceptions, European social democracy has heaped major defeat upon defeat. And as for the victories, well: George Papandreou could be forgiven for thinking that one should indeed look a gift horse in the mouth, especially if it’s a Trojan one such as the helm of the Greek government. The painful losses, and the occasional painful victory, are enough to speed up the process of ageing. Yet, the problem appears to be that social democracy’s supporters were increasingly grey to begin with.
Social democracy is now the oldest modern party family in Europe. And its age is beginning to show. It is apparent in the composition of its membership and its voters, and to varying degrees in the mid-level party leaderships as well. And it is disturbing both because of what it heralds for the electoral prospects and political clout of social democracy, and also because I don’t see the problem much addressed anywhere. I could easily fill the space provided here with relevant and revealing anecdotes. Since you are not a captive audience, I won’t do that, but did you hear the one about the socialist party inviting the youngest members from each of its local organisations to a national meeting? Most participants travelled with a senior discount. Sure, I made this one up, but from what I have seen with my own eyes, it appears realistic.
To bring the argument closer to home: today, the Hungarian Socialist Party’s (MSZP) last bastion before next month’s national elections are (and in fact have been for a while) pensioners. If it were up to young voters, the MSZP might even fail to take the five percent threshold. When I pointed out years ago to a political advisor how disconcerting it is that young Hungarians mostly favour the right, he cautioned that their current preferences are not necessarily indicative of their future choices. And that is true, especially as the odds are they are not going to have any stable preferences whatsoever, given that ‘party loyalty’ is increasingly an oxymoron.
However fickle voter behaviour may be, though, there is little indication that social democracy has made any big strides to even temporarily capture those that will turn thirty in the coming years, let alone those reaching their voting age in the near future. Please forgive me if I generalise from what may very well be the experience of a few countries and social democratic parties – if the above or the below do not apply to your country/party, do not hesitate to argue with me and to share how the respective social democratic force has managed to capture the hearts (and votes) of younger citizens.
The choices that young voters make differ from country to country, but a common denominator is often that social democracy is not en vogue. In Germany, the liberal FDP (which does not even bother to feign a concern for social justice) actually outpolled the SPD among young voters in last year’s Bundestag elections, while the best age group for the SPD was by far the generation over 60. In Sweden, where the Pirates swept the young electorate, the SAP – which I would agree is, or rather was, the second ‘most successful political party in the democratic world’ – came in third among youth, which is, incidentally, considered a decent result nowadays.
The reasons are too complex and too varied to analyse in a single column. They extend both to deficiencies in public policy formulation and to a more elusive concept, the dearth of emotional appeal (and the populist candidates that embody it). In Germany, for instance, it appears that many young voters find that the Greens are credible enough with regard to social justice concerns, while the SPD came late and/or with insufficient conviction to the ‘post-modern’ issues such as the environment, gender, minorities, etc. And when social democrats do bolster their credibility on these subject matters, they face another dilemma that is my pet issue: many of their older, traditional voters are not all too keen on this, thus leaving social democrats with a difficult balancing act that tries to please very different demographics. It is not altogether clear whether there is any way to make both groups happy simultaneously; what is obvious, however, is that it would be the only way to maintain or regain a status as a mass party.
Hungary is a good illustration of the other problem: lacking emotional appeal. The Hungarian left, up to now the almost exclusive terrain of the MSZP, has been loath to engage in any type of emotional politics or communication. This left voters who crave that – in addition to public administration – politics also provide an identity and sense of belonging, with the right-wing as their only option. Recently, the choice has broadened to include the extreme-right, which has been stunningly successful in constructing a vast subculture, including various widely-read portals, a music scene, cultural events, etc. that draws in wide swaths of the Hungarian youth, the conspicuous racist, homophobic and irredentist elements of this subculture notwithstanding.
Many analysts have become comfortable with the fact that politics is no longer the terrain for massive ideological battles that trigger strong emotional responses, but it appears that some segments of the electorate are not entirely reconciled with the technocratic vision of politics that social democracy has also espoused recently. Voters may choose rationally, but it appears that supplemental to their rational decision to support a party programme, many – youth in particular – also seek the larger context that makes their choice emotionally satisfying. This, social democracy often fails to deliver.
Capturing the youth will take individualised strategies, but it will necessarily include a mix of policy and emotive politics. Alternatively, social democrats might decide to wait for young voters to become older and gradually cross over to them once the romance of their current political attachment fades. But take caution – what some may be tempted to write off as a not fully-mature choice may in fact persist, if not as the party loyalty of yore, then at least as a loose affiliation. In Germany, there are signs that Green voters are making impressive inroads with older groups – for all groups under sixty, support for the Greens was nearly constant. Indeed, a few decades from now social democrats may enjoy the sight of masses of ancient-looking Green voters still fretting over the inconstancy of their party; they may even see the Greens lose touch with the youth. But with a view of the current trends, it isn’t inconceivable that by then social democrats will have become the challengers of the ‘Green establishment’.
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All Content
Dear Gabor, I hope your column was intended as a wake-up call, especially regarding the blind spot that many Western European parties have when it comes to Eastern and Central European circumstances.
I don’t think in general that the situation is quite as bad as you portray, but I also noticed that none of the organisations that should (PES, Socialist Group, and the new think tank FEPS) pay enough attention to what the situation is like and what needs to be done. As a pro-European living in the UK, I think most of our organisations are still in denial. This needs to change sooner rather than later and we need, as you rightly argue, a new social democratic politics that is emotional as well as rational.
Yes, very rightly the point is, how to reconcile the two social groups? The old and the young (roughly, very roughly said)?. Well, it may be a matter of “feelings” and “big visions”, but… this is true only if logically linked with the fact that we are not able to envisage foreseeable growth (e.g. increasinlgy better jobs and wages) as we did (at least in the western part of the EU) until the mid-seventies. This creates anxiety, and increases the appeal of populism. Those who are not attracted by this appeal, i.e. those who support the post-68 values of the green left, for example, are often younger than socialdemocratic voters, BUT youth is not a reason in itself for this electoral behaviour. Rather, they are very likely to be anti-populist if their economic condition (and/or the neighborhoods where they live) allows them to be relatively little anxious about the future: this is the best defence against the xenofobic populistic propaganda.
By yhe way, in 2005 the score of Spd in the younger section of the electorate was not that bad. The italian center-left was also quite well performing amongst youngest generations in previous elections, not in 2008. Tendencies can be reversed.
First, the problem of post-communist Hungarian Socialist Party should not be confused with that of Western European social democracy. These are two completely different things.
Second, the social democracy in Hungary is only now can be reborn. So far, it was successfully prevented by the Communists.
Third, regeneration of the whole left side in Europe can be made only by the social democracy. Any other left-wing ideology has been proved condemned to fail.
Fourth, besides the freedom and other human rights citizenship should be given to the traditional social democratic themes too, such as the enforcement of workers’ interests, social redistribution of wealth, the rollback of the financial world power, internationalism etc..
Well done to Gábor for raising such an interesting topic. I think the success of parties such as Die Linke largely displaces much of what Gábor is saying here – and I suspect that the truth is finally dawning on the (new) leadership of the SPD.
Young people and social democratic parties: five crucial factors
1. Does the (Social-Democratic) Party campaign? Is it active in the streets, communities and organisations, pushing a social justice agenda?
2. Does the Party have an existing youth section, and what kind of people are involved? Are they actually activists, or careerists? Here’s a theory: for activists to be attracted, the youth section would need to be far-left.
3. Is the Party run in a top-down fashion, with policy determined by a narrow set? What is the de facto policy-making process?
4. Are there genuine links with trade unions and other NGOs, where young people could be brought in to the party?
5. Does the Party have an open mind to adopting clear, socially guided policies with a distinctly radical edge, rather than ‘consolidatory’ or a ‘timid’ approach?
By expanding this approach we could plot a graph with 2 axes: Centralised vs Participatory, and Populist vs Consensus.
Looking at the answers of the UK Labour Party:
1. Rarely
2. Mainly careerist with exceptions
3. Very centralised
4. Union links exist throughout party
5. Policy is very constrained
Or looking at the Hungarian Socialist Party:
1. Not active
2. Almost entirely careerist
3. Very centralised
4. Only superficial links with unions
5. Policy totally constrained
In contrast, the French Socialists fare relatively well:
1. Active across the country
2. A mixture of idealism and careerism
3. Competing blocs of policy
4. Fairly close contact with unions, competing with far-left
5. Policy is mildly constrained
A bit long for a blog comment, but I’ll leave it there.
Dear All,
I thank you for all the great comments, I am pleased that the article elicited so many responses! Sorry for the delayed reply on my part, here are some thought regarding the points you raised:
Richard: “I hope your column was intended as a wake-up call”
It was indeed. But there have been a few before and I suspect there will be many more. When my alarm clock rings, I tend to hit the snooze button a lot, and social democracy, too, has a predilection for putting off such issues. I think the main purpose of such articles is to add to the discourse, trigger interest and to help ensure that at one point the circle of those concerned about this reaches critical mass, which in turn filters back into the political machine.
„I don’t think in general that the situation is quite as bad as you portray, but I also noticed that none of the organisations that should pay enough attention to”
I truly wish the problem wasn’t quite as bad – but my sense is that at least in some countries, e.g. Germany and Hungary, it is indeed. A day after I submitted this article for publication, I attended a presentation in Budapest by Professor Wolfgang Merkel, who said SPD members are on average (!) over 60. My hunch would be that in countries that have no successful green parties (Spain, Greece, Portugal) this may be somewhat less of a problem (unless the extreme left disproportionately draws young voters), and I know Labour’s numbers are not bad (no Green competition there either). As for the rest, a detailed research would be interesting.
Paolo:
“Yes, very rightly the point is, how to reconcile the two social groups? The old and the young”
“Tendencies can be reversed.” – Maybe so – regarding this particular tendency, I have my doubts –, but individual elections do not indicate reversed trends. MSZP was fairly successful among young voters for the first time in 2006, but that was an exception rather than a trend reversal, and now the numbers are worse than ever. What I think happens with candidates like Obama, the early Blair, the early Schröder, Zapatero, etc. is that they project a dynamic populism that draws young voters. It helps when they run against charisma-challenged people like McCain, Major and Kohl. But still, they do not transform trends but rather temporarily subvert them. A dynamic candidate with the right messages (not programme, mind you), can temporarily bring young voters into the fold, but their support does not indicate prolonged commitment.
“Those who are not attracted by this appeal, i.e. those who support the post-68 values of the green left, for example, are often younger than socialdemocratic voters, BUT youth is not a reason in itself for this electoral behaviour. Rather, they are very likely to be anti-populist if their economic condition (and/or the neighborhoods where they live) allows them to be relatively little anxious about the future: this is the best defence against the xenofobic populistic propaganda.”
I very strongly agree with this point, but I also believe that it does not contradict my opinion as laid out in the article above.
Csaba: “First, the problem of post-communist Hungarian Socialist Party should not be confused with that of Western European social democracy. These are two completely different things.”
There are many differences and also many similarities. Here, I was referring to some of the poignant similarities, while pointing out some differences.
Carl: Great to discuss with you again! I very much like the systematic approach you presented and I largely agree with it analytically. Two empirical exceptions: I do not know the French numbers, but I am not sure whether the PS is doing all that well against the Greens and the far left in competing for younger voters. If that is the case, I am pleased (though until very recently they did not have much political success to show for it), but I have my doubts. Regarding Labour: I have no clue what the Labour party membership looks like, but in doing the research for this article, I found that Labour is doing surprisingly well among young voters (at least up to 2005). I had expected the LibDems to be much stronger, but the polls here suggest that at least among voters Labour had no significant deficiency as late as 2005:
That said, being on the timid/conciliatory wing of social democrat myself, I find it important that we do not resolve the lack of support from group (in this case youth), by alienating others. I agree that democratic politics is about taking stances and delineating positions that distinguish parties from one another. At the same time I would not want social democracy to recapture (some!) youth voters by blowing off entire segments of society that seek moderate and less populist approaches. There are two dilemmas here. One, are youth really only attracted by a more radical left-wing approach? I doubt it: in Germany both the FDP and the Greens (with the latter lurching disconcertingly to the Christian Democrats) fared better than the SPD among youth – the latter relatively speaking, and the former absolutely speaking as well. The far left Linke, on the other hand, was not as clearly disproportionately successful among young voters as the more moderate small parties.
Second, the challenge as far as I am concerned is not constructing a party that best reflects a narrow vision of what left-wing means. The challenge, in this context, is to bring as many people together as possible in support of a progressive vision of society. This will involve compromises (as democratic politics always does – and the lacking acceptance of this concept, i.e. the demand for absolute success or total defeat is something I often observe in debates and find very disturbing) and ingenuity. I am now particularly interested in the latter, for I would agree that the social democratic leadership has been too obsessed with the compromise bit and less successful with finding ways to forge new coalitions of voters based on renewed visions. I was planning on picking up on this issue in my May column, since April will probably be taken up by the elections here). But I may also tie it into the discussion of the Hungarian elections.
One final thought: the stream of careerists not only into the MSZP, but into all established parties in Hungary, is indeed extremely frightening and disheartening. And the parties have quite knowingly cultivated this breed of youth politicians. MSZP will pay a steep price for this now, and what is most worrying is that one can only hope that when the time comes for Fidesz to also face the consequences of this, the extreme right won’t be the main beneficiary.
PS: I really enjoyed our exchange last time. I did not follow up on your last comments because I was thinking about turning my thoughts about it into a column, which may happen later in the year. I am sorry if it sounds like I subordinate a good debate to my role as a columnist; I hope that this is generally not the case, but I do hog the ideas that I find the most important, so that before (and if) I turn into a pundit who will always have some ideas about anything that just happens to be ongoing, I can offer some thoughts on the issues that I find most interesting or that I care most about.
And here is the link to Labour’s numbers in 2005, which I forgot to include above: http://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/poll.aspx?oItemId=451
Hi Gábor, a follow-up rant and a further suggestion for future analysis…
My reference point was based on levels of youth activism rather than levels of youth vote. I can honestly say that being a Conservative in the UK is a deeply uncool thing for a young person, and most significant cultural weight is still heavily stacked to the left of Labour.
The current disillusionment with politics therefore reflects direct disillusionment with the lack of popular socialism in Labour’s record, the lack of a genuine alternative. This is combined with the fact that should a situation arise again involving a decision to go to war, most people do not trust Labour now to opt instinctively for a peaceful solution. Which is shameful, given Labour’s commitment to internationalism since its inception (including a delegation in the 1920s which prevented some of the worst excesses of Horthy’s White Terror).
I can only point to a time in the early 1980s (“when I were a lad”) when the youth wing of Labour was extremely active: but this was when the Trotskyist Militant Tendency was predominant. I don’t want Militant back: but I want socialism back, perhaps a new type of participatory eco-socialism, but socialism none the less. Contrary to many involved in the PES, I think the post-war welfare state was just the beginning, not a historical “high point” which is defended “as is.”
The thing is, I can’t see why, without an injection of intellectual and organisational energy, young people would want to be involved in Labour. The campaigning aspect of the Party as a movement for radical social change and democratisation, the part that connects to community activism, has been totally neglected. There are some signs that the far-left, Greens and anarchist organisations such as the IWCA would like to get directly involved with community activism, and as socialists and social democrats, there is nothing we can really say about this.
We are reverting to the same patchy community base and patronage that characterized 19th century socialism. Far-left groups are full of wannabe Marxes, but there are not enough Engels! So young people turn their backs on politics. Switch off.
Without a political alternative many people are finding an outlet through artistic expression (take for example the AntiScrap art collective, or the many groups around Brighton). Not so the case in Hungary: different opposition parties, different cultures.
Put it this way. In Western Europe, a number of left activity systems are not connecting to Labour, and Labour’s leadership is not really interested. Whilst in Hungary, a massive job might be to begin the creation and strengthening of these activity systems, self-organised groups and participatory cultures. And certainly the greens in Hungary in the shape of the LMP, has some lead in this already, but these systems are still too weak and fragmented to provide a sure electoral base.
So in my opinion a crucial field of study for people who are serious about building an inclusive left culture in EU countries would be to look at this not only from a structural perspective, but to also focus on the creation and nurturing of activity systems, following the theories of progressive Marxists such as Engeström and Castells. This means forums to confront the contradictions and tensions of modern capitalism and to have micro-organisations and groups which are capable of “expansive learning” – that can re-define their activities on an ongoing basis. Learning organisations, full of people who are learning, who are robust enough to handle some amount of internal contradiction, and adapt accordingly. Could this be what a modern party should look like, in a networked society?
In regards to Die Linke, I can only say I was deeply impressed by the Bundestag walk-out. Not only that they put their message across perfectly, but also that they did not look like politicians. In some regards, they are more Lennonist than Leninist – and all the better for it.
A quick follow-up. Herbert Morrison was once asked for his definition of socialism.
“It’s what Labour Governments do” he replied.
Perhaps the correct response would be “It’s what socialists do.”
Answering this riddle would, I believe, provide a future for the movement.